Trenton

Trenton: The Turning Point That Saved a Revolution

By the late autumn of 1776, the American experiment in independence was dying. What had begun with soaring rhetoric in Philadelphia the previous July had, by December, collapsed into a desperate retreat across the frozen landscape of New Jersey. General George Washington's Continental Army—once numbering nearly 20,000 men—had been beaten on Long Island, driven from Manhattan, chased across the Hudson, and pushed relentlessly southward through New Jersey by a confident British force under General William Howe and his aggressive subordinate, Lord Charles Cornwallis. When Washington finally crossed the Delaware River into Pennsylvania on December 7 and 8, he commanded fewer than 6,000 men, many of them barefoot, sick, and demoralized. Enlistments for the majority of his soldiers would expire on December 31. Without a dramatic reversal, there would be no army left to fight. It was in this desperate hour that the small colonial town of Trenton, New Jersey, became the site of events that would alter the entire trajectory of the war—and, arguably, the course of world history.

Trenton in 1776 was a modest river town of perhaps a hundred buildings, situated at the head of navigation on the Delaware River where the Assunpink Creek emptied into the larger waterway. At the time, Trenton's two main streets were King (now Warren) Street and Queen (now Broad) Street. Its strategic value lay in its position along the main road between New York and Philadelphia, the colonial capital. The largest structure in Trenton in 1776 was the Old Barracks, built in 1758 to house soldiers of the British Army during the French and Indian War — constructed due to colonial protest of the quartering of British troops within their homes . After Washington's retreat into Pennsylvania, British and Hessian forces established a chain of outposts across central New Jersey—when British General William Howe decided to shelter for the winter, he created a chain of 17 outposts across New Jersey, including three along the Delaware River in Burlington, Bordentown, and Trenton. The garrison at Trenton was assigned to approximately 1,400 Hessian soldiers under the command of Colonel Johann Rall. Rall's brigade was composed of three regiments of Hessians, which bore the names of Rall, von Knyphausen, and von Lossberg.

On December 14, the three regiments arrived in Trenton, where they planned to billet for the winter, and were soon joined by several Jäger detachments as well as by Colonel Stirling's 42nd Highland Regiment. Rall, 50 years old at the time of the Trenton attack, was an accomplished soldier with 36 years of experience in the Hessian army. He had distinguished himself at the Battle of White Plains and the storming of Fort Washington, but he was also a man of considerable arrogance who reportedly dismissed the ragged Americans as no real threat. He was revered as an empathetic leader by those who served under him but disliked by his superiors, many of whom were younger and of more aristocratic backgrounds; they felt Rall was crude and lacked respect for their authority. Rall was brash in his manner, uneducated, and had little interest in learning English.

His request for reinforcements had been turned down by British commander General James Grant, who disdained the American rebels and thought them poor soldiers. He neglected to fortify his position, ignored warnings of a possible attack, and maintained only minimal patrols. Some Hessian officers advised Rall to fortify the town, and two of his engineers drew up plans for a redoubt at the upper end of town and fortifications elsewhere, but Rall dismissed them. Meanwhile, Col. Carl von Donop, who commanded the nearby Hessian garrison at Bordentown and shared a mutual contempt with Rall, moved his command even farther from Trenton the day before the battle, ignoring Rall's pleas to come closer to support him.

As Washington's army shivered along the Pennsylvania bank of the Delaware, a powerful piece of writing galvanized what remained of the Patriot cause. Thomas Paine published the first of thirteen numbered pieces in his series The American Crisis on December 19, 1776, just a few days before the Battle of Trenton.

Paine's pamphlet was passed around campfires, reigniting a passion for the revolutionary cause and helping to steady the soldiers' spirits and resolve.

Washington commanded that the freshly printed pamphlet be read aloud to his dispirited men , though there is no contemporary account confirming that Washington read the text aloud, or had it read aloud, to the troops before they crossed the Delaware.

Washington's plan for the attack was bold, complicated, and perilous. He planned for three American forces to cross the Delaware River: around 2,400 soldiers under his personal command would cross at McConkey's Ferry and converge on Trenton; a second force under Colonel John Cadwalader would attack the Hessian garrison at Bordentown to prevent them from reinforcing Trenton; and a third force under Brigadier General James Ewing would block the bridge at Assunpink Creek and complete the isolation of Trenton. Colonel Henry Knox would command the artillery and the crossing operation.

Washington wrote the phrase "Victory or Death" on a piece of paper—words that would serve as the password for the surprise attack.

On the freezing night of December 25, 1776, Washington's column began embarking. The crossing relied on strongly built Durham cargo vessels, which had a shallow draft and were 40 to 60 feet in length, typically used to move iron ore down river—they were sturdy and had high side walls.

Colonel John Glover and his Marblehead Regiment—experienced seafarers from Massachusetts—piloted and steered the Durham boats through ice-choked waters and a howling nor'easter. According to Henry Knox, eighteen guns were moved across the Delaware on that historic night—cannon that would prove the deciding factor in the battle.

Delays and conditions at other crossing points meant that the groups under Cadwalader and Ewing failed to make the crossing.

The last soldier reached the eastern bank at 3 a.m., and it was 4 a.m. on December 26 before Washington's soldiers were ready to start their march toward Trenton —hours behind schedule, with no supporting columns.

Washington pressed on regardless. His force was divided into two corps under Major Generals John Sullivan and Nathanael Greene.

Sullivan's command would approach Trenton along the River Road on the west edge of town, while Greene's columns would enter the town by its two principal road arteries.

Shortly after eight o'clock in the morning, the Continental Army started its charge on the town.

Delays in the crossing meant that it was daylight by the time they reached Trenton, but Washington still achieved the surprise he sought—the storm that had delayed the crossing provided cover, and the Hessian outposts on the edge of town were quickly overrun.