Trenton

Trenton: The Turning Point That Saved a Revolution

By the late autumn of 1776, the American experiment in independence was dying. What had begun with soaring rhetoric in Philadelphia the previous July had, by December, collapsed into a desperate retreat across the frozen landscape of New Jersey. General George Washington's Continental Army—once numbering nearly 20,000 men—had been beaten on Long Island, driven from Manhattan, chased across the Hudson, and pushed relentlessly southward through New Jersey by a confident British force under General William Howe and his aggressive subordinate, Lord Charles Cornwallis. When Washington finally crossed the Delaware River into Pennsylvania on December 7 and 8, he commanded fewer than 6,000 men, many of them barefoot, sick, and demoralized. Enlistments for the majority of his soldiers would expire on December 31. Without a dramatic reversal, there would be no army left to fight. It was in this desperate hour that the small colonial town of Trenton, New Jersey, became the site of events that would alter the entire trajectory of the war—and, arguably, the course of world history.

Trenton in 1776 was a modest river town of perhaps a hundred buildings, situated at the head of navigation on the Delaware River where the Assunpink Creek emptied into the larger waterway. At the time, Trenton's two main streets were King (now Warren) Street and Queen (now Broad) Street. Its strategic value lay in its position along the main road between New York and Philadelphia, the colonial capital. After Washington's retreat into Pennsylvania, British and Hessian forces established a chain of outposts across central New Jersey— when British General William Howe decided to shelter for the winter, he created a chain of 17 outposts across New Jersey, including three along the Delaware River in Burlington, Bordentown, and Trenton. The garrison at Trenton was assigned to approximately 1,400 Hessian soldiers under the command of Colonel Johann Rall. Rall, 50 years old at the time of the Trenton attack, was an accomplished soldier with 36 years of experience in the Hessian army. He had distinguished himself at the Battle of White Plains and the storming of Fort Washington, but he was also a man of considerable arrogance who reportedly dismissed the ragged Americans as no real threat. He was revered as an empathetic leader by those who served under him but disliked by his superiors, many of whom were younger and of more aristocratic backgrounds; they felt Rall was crude and lacked respect for their authority.

His request for reinforcements had been turned down by British commander General James Grant, who disdained the American rebels and thought them poor soldiers. He neglected to fortify his position, ignored warnings of a possible attack, and maintained only minimal patrols. Some Hessian officers advised Rall to fortify the town, and two of his engineers drew up plans for a redoubt at the upper end of town and fortifications along the river, but Rall disagreed with them. Intelligence about Rall's dispositions and vulnerabilities reached Washington through multiple channels, including, according to persistent tradition, a cattleman and probable double agent named John Honeyman, who may have been captured by American forces and delivered firsthand observations of the garrison's lax state of readiness.

Meanwhile, on December 19, the first installment of Thomas Paine's pamphlet The American Crisis began circulating among the troops. "These are the times that try men's souls," Paine wrote. "The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman." Washington ordered the pamphlet read aloud to his assembled regiments. Its effect on morale, while impossible to quantify precisely, was by all accounts significant. Paine had transmuted the army's suffering into a narrative of righteous endurance, and on December 20, reinforcements under General John Sullivan—some 2,000 men—arrived in camp, giving Washington enough troops to put a daring plan into action.

Washington's scheme was characteristically bold: a three-pronged assault on the Hessian garrison at Trenton, to be launched on Christmas night. John Cadwalader was to lead a force of some 1,800 Philadelphia militiamen and Continental troops in an attack on Burlington, New Jersey, south of Trenton, to ensure that the British garrison there could not reinforce the Hessians. Brigadier General James Ewing, at the head of nearly 1,000 Pennsylvania militiamen, was to capture the bridge across Assunpink Creek to block the Hessians' most likely escape route. Washington's force of some 2,400 Continentals would cross the Delaware 10 miles upstream and march south to assault the Trenton garrison.

Washington chose the challenge or countersign of "Victory or Death" for his forces who crossed the river —a phrase that captured the existential stakes of the gamble.

The logistical heart of the crossing fell to two indispensable officers. Washington ordered the dangerous and difficult task of crossing the river in treacherous winter conditions to be placed "under the direction of Colonel Knox" —Henry Knox, the army's chief of artillery, a former Boston bookseller whose self-taught mastery of military science had already made him one of Washington's most trusted subordinates. Under Knox's overall command, the Continentals brought 18 cannons over the river—3-pounders, 4-pounders, some 6-pounders, horses to pull the carriages, and enough ammunition for the coming battle. Manning the boats was Colonel John Glover of Massachusetts and the famous "Marblehead Regiment," the 14th Continental Regiment, which ferried Washington's troops across the Delaware River.

The modest militia had become one of the few integrated regiments in the entire army —composed of White, Black, Native American, and at least one Jewish member among its seafaring ranks. Much of Washington's force crossed the river in shallow-draft Durham boats—strongly built cargo vessels, most between 40 and 60 feet in length, designed to move iron ore and bulk goods down the river to markets in and around Philadelphia. As Knox wrote to his wife Lucy on December 28, "the night was cold & stormy It haild with great violence," and ice floes made the river almost impassable.

The crossing, begun at nightfall on December 25, ran hours behind schedule. Carrying out a nighttime amphibious operation on an ice-choked river in the face of a powerful nor'easter was a daunting prospect, and the forces under Cadwalader and Ewing were unable to make the crossing. Washington's column alone succeeded, but it did not reach the New Jersey shore until approximately 3:00 a.m.—far later than the planned pre-dawn arrival in Trenton. Washington briefly considered aborting the mission, but pressed on. The army split into two columns for the final approach: the troops marched in two columns, with General John Sullivan leading one column and General Nathanael Greene leading the other, with artillery commanded by Colonel Henry Knox accompanying the troops. Among the officers in that freezing march were men whose names would resound through the next century of American life: Founding Fathers James Monroe and Alexander Hamilton were part of Washington's force that crossed the river.

During the night of the surprise attack, Hamilton's skill and experience were crucial; serving in Lord Stirling's brigade, Captain Hamilton and Captain Forrest's artillery companies were assigned to cover King Street.

Washington's forces reached the outskirts of Trenton around 8:00 AM on December 26. Though the element of pre-